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Fugu fish, one of the most celebrated and notorious dishes in
Japanese cuisine, is lethal if not prepared correctly. Because the fugu's
poison can lead to death, only licensed cooks are allowed to prepare

this delicacy. Despite its inherent dangers, fugu remains a special feast
in Japan

Like the fugu chef,2 the concerned mediator must know how to
carefully dissect the parties' dispute, allowing them to reap the
benefits of mediation without harming themselves in subsequent
criminal litigation. Like the consumers of fugu, mediation participants
must be warned of potential dangers. Participants need to know that
there are limits to confidentiality and that everything said in
mediation is not necessarily privileged.' Without such a caveat,
mediation participants may open their mouths and unwarily take a
bite of the "poisonous fish," leaving on the table statements that could
be used against them in later criminal proceedings.
One of the hallmarks of mediation is its claim that people should
feel free to speak openly because mediation communications are

confidential.4 Unfortunately, participants and attorneys alike often
blur the distinction between confidential and privileged.
1. Japanese Lifestyle, Fugu, http://www.japaneselifestyle.com.au/food/fugu.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
Fish,
Fugu
Corporation,
Broadcasting
British
2. See
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A752429 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) ("The rules for
preparing fugu are extremely strict. There are rules for cleanliness and preparation, storage
of the toxic parts, and careful reporting on the amount of fish handled and the distribution
of the internal organs. People with poor vision or who are colour blind are not eligible to
train as fugu chefs.").
3. See Mary Ellen Reimund, Confidentiality in Victim Offender Mediation: A False
Promise?, 2004 J. DiSP. RESOL. 401, 401 (2004).
4. Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85
MARQ. L. REV. 9, 24-25 (2001) ("Confidentiality is constructed from two distinct, but
intertwined principles which arise out of certain professional relationships such as:
now, mediator-disputant.
and
doctor-patient,
clergy-penitent,
attorney-client,
Confidentiality represents, first, a positive duty not to disclose secret communications and,
second, the freedom to refuse to answer questions in court." (footnotes omitted)); see also
Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides with
Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 35 (2001) ("One of the fundamental axioms of
mediation is the importance of confidentiality. It is deemed necessary to foster the
neutrality of the mediator and essential if parties are to participate fully in the process.").
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Confidentiality is an obligation not to disclose certain information;5
whereas privilege is the right to preclude protected information from
disclosure in legal proceedings.6 The significance of this distinction is
that something that is confidential is not necessarily privileged.7 As
the support for mediation in the civil and criminal context continues
to expand,8 the distinction between confidentiality and privilege
becomes increasingly critical. For mediation to function effectively,

mediation privilege rules must address not only the actual dispute but
also the possible use of the mediation communications in subsequent

criminal litigation
This article focuses on the interplay between mediated disputes
and subsequent criminal litigation. Part I discusses the differences
between confidentiality and privilege. Part II analyzes five pre-

Uniform Mediation Act cases, which illustrate the problems that can
arise when someone seeks to introduce exculpatory or inculpatory
evidence gleaned from mediation in a subsequent criminal
proceeding. Part III focuses on the Uniform Mediation Act '° (UMA

or the Act)-how mediation privilege differs from other recognized
privileges, and the exceptions to privilege under the UMA, with

particular focus on the criminal proceedings exception and its
substantially outweighs standard. Part IV explores how the outcomes
of the five cases might have been affected had they been decided in

UMA jurisdictions, and what guidance the Act provides in
determining the parameters of the criminal proceedings exception.

Part V asks whether mediators in UMA jurisdictions have an ethical
5. Hughes, supra note 4, at 25.
6. Evidentiary privilege is "[an evidentiary rule that gives a witness the option not
to disclose the fact asked for, even though it might be relevant; [or] the right to prevent
disclosure of certain information in court, esp[ecially] when the information was originally
communicated in a professional or confidential relationship." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY
1235 (8th ed. 1999).
7. In analyzing qualified privileges, courts weigh the need for the evidence against
the societal benefit of upholding the privilege. Alan Kirtley, Best of Both Worlds, Uniform
Mediation Privilege Should Draw from Both Absolute and Qualified Approaches, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., winter 1998, at 5, 6.
8. Mindy D. Rufenacht, Comment, The Concern Over Confidentiality in
Mediation-An In-Depth Look at the Protection Provided by the Uniform Mediation Act,
2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 113, 113 (2000).
9. See Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management Criminal Mediation, 40
IDAHO L. REV. 571, 619-20 (2004).
10. Reimund, supra note 3, at 420 ("The UMA is a collaboration between the
NCCUSL and the American Bar Association's (ABA) Section on Dispute Resolution to
establish a confidentiality privilege for mediators and participants. The UMA . . . has
received support from the ABA, dispute resolution professional organizations and service
providers and leading dispute resolution scholars.").
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obligation to inform mediation participants about the limits of
confidentiality under the criminal proceedings exception. The article
concludes by recommending that: (1) courts should consider the
particular sequence of events on a case-by-case basis when balancing
the admissibility of exculpatory evidence from mediation; (2) courts
should be reluctant to admit mediation communications from a
session convened to resolve a criminal matter; (3) mediators should
inform participants about the criminal proceedings exception that now
exists in jurisdictions that have adopted the UMA; and (4) the
mediation community should implement an on-line tutorial training
for mediators on confidentiality and privilege.

I.

CONFIDENTIALITY V. PRIVILEGE IN THE MEDIATION CONTEXT

Confidentiality and privilege differ both in their bases and
purposes." Confidentiality is based on a promise not to share
information with anyone outside the confidential relationship and is
designed to promote candid discussions. 2 In contrast, privilege is the
right to refuse to disclose confidential information and the right to
preclude others from disclosing that information in court." Privileges
are meant to nurture specific interpersonal or professional
relationships that courts, society, and legislatures deem desirable.' 4
Ambiguity arises because mediators frequently begin mediations
with sweeping statements such as, "Everything we say here is
confidential. Nothing that we say here can be used in court;" or "It's
very important in mediation that people talk honestly about the
situation and about what they need. Confidentiality is critical to the
process. Will you promise not to repeat to anyone outside this
mediation what is said here?" These broad statements fail to
distinguish between confidentiality and privilege and provide
mediation participants with a false sense of security that their
15
statements will remain within the confines of the room.
11. See generally Hughes, supra note 4, at 25-36 (discussing confidentiality and
privilege in the mediation context).
12. Id. at 25.
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1235 (8th ed. 1999).
14. Deborah A. Ausburn, Note, Circling the Wagons: Informational Privacy and
Family Testimonial Privileges, 20 GA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985) (indicating that privileges
are intended to "serve a function outside the courtroom"); Kathleen L. Cerveny & Marian
J. Kent, Evidence Law-The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege in FederalCourts, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 791, 793-94 (1984).
15. Reimund, supra note 3, at 401 ("Repeating the promise of confidentiality during
mediation gives mediators and parties a sense of security about their conversations, but
unfortunately the promise does not yield an impermeable shield of confidentiality.").
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Providing parties with an assurance of confidentiality has
advantages and disadvantages. Confidentiality in mediation serves
several important purposes including fostering a sense of trust in the
mediator and facilitating the parties' openness and willingness to work
through the process.1 6 A cornerstone of confidentiality is the
understanding of the parties that the mediator will not disclose their
statements to anyone outside their confidential relationship. 7
Although essential to creating confidence in the mediation
process, confidentiality can also be an impediment to effective
monitoring of the participants' conduct. 8 Confidentiality may conflict
with each party's desire in a judicial proceeding to access all relevant
evidence," whether that simply be reporting on disputants' refusal to
participate in good faith, 20 or using exculpatory or inculpatory
16. See Ellen E. Deason, PredictableMediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal
System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 239, 243-51 (2002) (discussing the important role
that the perception of confidentiality plays in fostering the flow of communication between
mediation participants as well as the other important functions of confidentiality in the
mediation context); Rufenacht, supra note 8, at 114 ("In order for the parties to reach an
acceptable agreement, the process of mediation must provide both parties with a sense of
trust and encourage them to make comments, verify facts, and discuss documents in the
mediation.").
17. Most mediators fail to fully and accurately explain confidentiality and privilege to
the disputants. Shawn P. Davisson, Balancing the Scales of "Confidential" Justice: Civil
Mediation Privileges in the Criminal Arena-Indispensable, Impracticable, or Merely
Unconstitutional?,38 McGEORGE L. REv. 679, 681 n.8 (2007) ("[I]n the area of mediation
confidentiality, the web of confidentiality caveats.., are rarely disclosed to parties in a
mediation, at least not in their entirety. The default approach is to inform participants that
the mediation is confidential and that the mediator will not voluntarily disclose
communications during the mediation. But even where there is selective disclosure
regarding exceptions to the confidentiality protection, the parties are never fully informed
of the myriad of circumstances under which something said during a mediation may make
its way onto the public streets or into the halls of justice, whether caused by actual party
disclosure or an 'involuntary' disclosure by the mediator.").
18. Monitoring participants' conduct is controversial. See infra note 20.
19. For further discussion of the efforts by which states have sought to create
mediation privilege rules that strike the proper balance between the need for mediation
confidentiality and the public's interest in access to information, see Alan Kirtley, The
Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation
Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants,the Process and the Public Interest,
1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 15 (1995).
20. Whether the mediator should monitor and report if the parties participated in
good faith or not is the subject of numerous articles and is beyond the scope of this article.
See Dr. iur. Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment-Against a Good-Faith
Requirement in Mandatory Mediation, 23 REV. LITIG. 1, 2, 13-14, 16 (2004) (arguing that
the good faith requirement enforced by many courts during mandatory, court-annexed
mediation poses serious risks to the confidentiality of the mediation process and the role of
the mediator, both of which are crucial to the effective working of the mediation process as
a whole); Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting"Good Faith" Reports Under the
Uniform MediationAct: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, 2003 J.

SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:943

statements made during mediation in a subsequent criminal case.21
Similarly, if a party admits to a past criminal wrong during the course
of mediation, an important question arises whether such evidence
should later be made available to the wronged person or to the court
in its truth-seeking role.22
Further, there remains a practical problem in differentiating
between confidential and privileged information. The distinction
between confidentiality and privilege becomes particularly important
when mediation statements are the subject of litigation. In such
circumstances, parties may contend that privilege precludes the other
party from using highly probative mediation communications in
litigation.23 Privileges by their very nature, however, "expressly
subordinate the goal of truth seeking to other societal interests., 24 In
contrast, relying solely on confidentiality-without privilege-a party
will likely be unsuccessful in preventing such statements from being
admitted in court.25 In essence, if it is not privileged, much of what
would be considered "confidential" in a social or contractual context
DIsP. RESOL. 67, 92, 97 (2003) (arguing that by omitting good faith reporting requirements
for mediators from the Uniform Mediation Act and, instead, including other provisions to
specifically deal with egregious party behavior, the drafters created an act that serves to
protect mediations' process and values); Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little [Good] Faith:
Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in
Mediations, 2002 J.DISP. RESOL. 367, 391-92, 398-405 (2002) (arguing for specific good
faith standards in mediations (including court ordered) but specifically precluding
mediator testimony about the conduct of the parties); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on
ParticipantConduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for GoodFaith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 618, 633 (2001)
(arguing that there is an implied good faith obligation on mediation participants and, as
such, confidentiality must give way, at least in some part, to allow for effective monitoring
and applicable sanctions for violations of this good faith obligation).
21. See Gabriel H. Teninbaum, Easing the Burden: Mediating Misdemeanor Criminal
Matters, DIsP. RESOL. J., May/July 2007, at 62, 65.
22. See id. at 65-66 (discussing the use of mediation as an alternative to criminal
litigation in jurisdictions that cannot keep up with the volume of misdemeanor criminal
matters entering their court systems). This author suggests that information discussed
during mediation in a criminal matter should not be subject to disclosure at trial if the
mediation does not result in settlement.
23. See generally 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006). Privilege is not designed to "facilitate the fact-finding process" or the "illumination
of truth"; privilege inhibits this process. Id. Privileges protect certain interests and
relationships that "are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some sacrifice
of availability of evidence relevant to the administration of justice." Id.
24. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1454 (1985).
25. For a more detailed discussion of the difference between confidentiality and
privilege and a proposed harmonization of the two from the context of attorney-client
privilege, see Fred C. Zacharias, HarmonizingPrivilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L.
REV. 69, 70-74, 89, 92-93, 95 (1999).
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is often within the bounds of discovery or production in court. Thus,
the difference between privilege and confidentiality in the mediation
context can be critical.

II.

FIVE CASES IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF MEDIATION
PRIVILEGE

Although few cases address the admissibility of mediation
communications in subsequent criminal cases, the existing case law
reveals the critical role mediation privilege rules play in the process.
Five published appellate decisions,26 from four different states,
highlight the problems that can arise when someone attempts to
introduce mediation communications in subsequent criminal
27 two Georgia cases,
proceedings-a Florida case, State v. Castellano;
2
9
Williams v. State' and Byrd v. State; an Idaho case, State v. Trejo;3°
and a New York case, People v. Snyder.3
These five cases are instructive on the evolution of mediation
privilege over the last twenty years and on the importance of
delineating the scope of mediation privilege rules. The cases address
the potential admissibility of both exculpatory evidence and
inculpatory evidence.32

26. Rinaker v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (Ct. App.
1998). This case is not included in the list of five cases, as it is a juvenile case. In Rinaker,
two minors were charged with vandalism. Id. at 161-62. In the juvenile delinquency
proceeding, the defendants offered the victim's statement from a civil harassment
mediation that ran concurrent to the delinquency proceeding. Id. at 162. During the
mediation, the victim admitted that he did not see the person who threw the rocks. Id. The
minors sought to subpoena the victim's testimony as a means of impeaching the victim's
statement at trial. Id. The court permitted the mediator's testimony holding that the
juveniles' constitutional right to confrontation trumped the public policy providing
confidentiality in mediation. Id. at 163.
27. 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
28. 342 S.E.2d 703, 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). Williams, a private settlement case, is
instructive in the court's subsequent decision in Byrd v. State, 367 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988).
29. 367 S.E.2d at 302-03.
30. 979 P.2d 1230, 1235, 1237 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999).
31. 492 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891-92 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
32. With the increased use of mediation to resolve criminal disputes, the question of
admitting mediation communications containing inculpatory evidence will become more
prevalent. See Davisson, supra note 17, at 681-83 (arguing for an amendment to the
UMA's criminal proceedings provision for a categorical privilege for evidence arising from
criminal mediations); see generally Laflin, supra note 9, at 572-74 (discussing case
management criminal mediation).

SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:943

A. Exculpatory Evidence Cases

Three cases-one from Florida, one from Idaho, and one from
New York-raise questions about whether a criminal defendant can
use statements from a mediation to support a claim of self-defense 3
In two of these cases, State v. Castellano34 and State v. Trejo,3 the
appellate courts ruled that the exculpatory statements were admissible

in the subsequent criminal cases. In the third, the court in People v.
Snyder quashed the subpoena to a community dispute center based on

the legislature's expressed intent to keep such communications
confidential.36
The admission

of exculpatory

evidence is based

on a

defendant's Sixth Amendment right, which guarantees that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."37 Central to

this right are the rights to cross-examine 38 and to impeach. 9 Selfdefense claims are premised on the belief that the victim's conduct
justified the defendant's actions.'
1. State v. Castellano
In the mid-1980s, in State v. Castellano, a Florida appellate court

refused to quash the subpoena of a mediator from a neighborhood
dispute resolution program when the accused claimed that threats
made during the mediation would support his claim of self-defense.41
The defendant, accused of murder, claimed that the victim made life-

threatening statements against him during the mediation. 2
In the absence of a codified mediation privilege rule, the court
held that the mediator had no legal authority on which to base an
33. See generally James Fayette, "If You Knew Him Like I Did, You'd Have Shot
Him, Too..."A Survey of Alaska's Law of Self-Defense, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 171,183-206
(2006) (discussing some of the essential questions about self-defense such as: Was this a
"force crime?" Who was the first aggressor? Did Defendant have a duty to retreat? Did
Defendant face an "imminent" threat? Were there prior combative acts near the time of
the incident?).
34. 460 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
35. 979 P.2d at 1236.
36. 492 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.").
39. Id.
40. New Orleans & Ne. R.R. Co. v. Jopes, 142 U.S. 18,23 (1891).
41. 460 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
42. Id. at 481.
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assertion of confidentiality.43 The court commented, "If confidentiality
is essential to the success of the [mediation] program, the legislature is
the proper branch of government from which to obtain the necessary
protection."" Florida took heed, and today has a mediation privilege
rule 45 and one of the most comprehensive ADR programs in the
country.46
2. State v. Trejo
In contrast, the Idaho Court of Appeals, in State v. Trejo, relied
on a technical reading of the State's mediation privilege rule to hold
that an estranged wife's statement made in the course of a child
custody mediation was admissible in her husband's subsequent
criminal trial.4 ' During one of the husband's weekends with his
children, the wife found him drinking in a bar and became angry,
believing he was misusing his visitation time.' In spite of an
outstanding no contact order, the wife took her sister and the sister's
boyfriend to the husband's house. 49 An altercation ensued, and the
husband shot his sister-in-law's boyfriend in the stomach." As a result
of the incident, the State charged the husband with aggravated

43. Id. at 481-82.
44. Id. at 482.
45. Effective July 1, 2004, the Florida legislature passed the Mediation
Confidentiality and Privilege Act, which provides confidentiality to any required mediation
and any mediation facilitated by a Florida Supreme Court certified mediator. Further, the
Act delineates the duration of mediation for confidentiality purposes and provides for
specific exceptions, an opt-out provision, and a civil remedy for violations of the Act. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 44.405 (West Supp. 2008).
46. See, e.g., Fran L. Tetunic, Florida Mediation Case Law: Two Decades of
Maturation, 28 NOVA L. REV. 87, 142 (2003) (discussing that Florida's mediation law
includes comprehensive laws and rules); Sharon Press, Institutionalizationof Mediation in
Florida: At the Crossroads, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 43, 53-54 (2003) (discussing the
comprehensiveness of Florida's mediation statute); Paul Dayton Johnson, Jr.,
Confidentiality in Mediation: What Can FloridaGlean from the Uniform MediationAct?, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 491, 93, (2003) (discussing the promotion of uniformity). UMA
prefatory note 3 spotlights Florida's ADR program, discussing that uniformity is a
necessary predicate to predictability if there is any potential that a statement made in
mediation in one state may be sought in litigation or other legal processes in another state.
For this reason, the UMA will benefit those states with clearly established law or
traditions, such as Texas, California, and Florida, ensuring that the privilege for mediation
communications made within those states is respected in other states in which those
mediation communications may be sought.
47. State v. Trejo, 979 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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battery."
After the shooting, but before trial, the husband and wife
attempted to resolve their custody dispute through mediation."
During the session, the wife stated, "I want to see him six feet
under. ' '53 At trial, defense counsel sought to introduce testimony from
the mediator on this comment.' The State objected, claiming that the
statement was privileged from disclosure under Idaho's mediation
privilege rule.5
The trial court allowed the mediator to invoke the privilege,
stating that it was "satisfied that the intent [of the mediation privilege
rule] was to make an absolute privilege."56 On appeal, the Idaho Court
of Appeals cited the express language of Idaho Rule of Evidence 507,
which states that "a client [in a mediation] has a privilege in any civil
or criminal action to which the client is a party. 57 Relying on the

language of the rule, the court reasoned that since the wife was not a
party in the criminal action, she was not entitled to assert the privilege
in the criminal action. 8 The court held that the privilege found in Rule
507 "cannot be invoked in a subsequent proceeding unless the
mediation client is a party to that proceeding. Furthermore, however
broadly the definition of a party may be read in other contexts, it
certainly does not include a mere witness, such as [the wife] was in this
criminal action."59 Under this rule, the victim could never assert the
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1235. Many question the wisdom of mediating cases with a history of
domestic violence. See, e.g., Barbara J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The FurtherEndangerment
of Battered Women and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317, 317-39
(1990); Mildred Daley Pagelow, Commentary, Justice for Victims of Spouse Abuse in
Divorce and Child Custody Cases, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 69, 75-76 (1993).
53. Trejo, 979 P.2d at 1235.
54. Id.
55. Id. Idaho Rule of Evidence 507 is Idaho's mediator privilege rule. IDAHO R.
EVID. 507. The husband-wife privilege was not a defense. Id. Rule 504(a) defines a
"communication" as "confidential" for purposes of the husband-wife privilege "if it is
made during marriage privately by any person to the person's spouse, and is not intended
for disclosure to any other person." IDAHO R. EVID. 504(a). In Trejo, the wife's statement
was made to the mediator, in Trejo's presence, and thus did not fall under the husbandwife privilege. See id.; Trejo, 979 P.2d at 1235.
56. Trejo, 979 P.2d at 1236 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting the trial court).
57. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting then existing IDAHO R. EVID. 507). The
Idaho Supreme Court adopted the UMA in January 2008. In re Adoption of New Idaho
Rule
of
Evidence
507,
ID
Order
08-03
(2008),
available
at
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/rules/IRE-ordlO8.pdf.
58. Trejo, 979 P.2d at 1236. This case makes it clear that only defendants in Idaho can
assert the privilege in a criminal proceeding, as a private party would never be a "party" in
a criminal action.
59. Id. The court ultimately concluded that while the trial court erred in admitting the
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privilege, as only the defendant and the State are the parties in
criminal cases.
3. People v. Snyder
In contrast, in People v. Snyder, a New York trial court presiding
over a murder case quashed a subpoena requesting records from a
community dispute resolution center relating to a prior mediation
between the victim and the defendant.' Defendant's counsel raised
the defense of justification, claiming that the defendant shot the victim
in self-defense; defense counsel referred in his opening statement to
the victim and defendant having participated in mediation prior to the
shooting.6' The prosecutor subpoenaed the mediation records, and the
community dispute resolution center moved to quash the subpoena.62
The court invalidated the subpoena, relying on the confidentiality
provisions of New York's statute governing community dispute
resolution centers, which dictated that "all memoranda, work
products, or case files of the mediator are confidential and not subject
to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding."63 The court
stated it did not want to "subvert the legislature's clear intention to
guarantee the confidentiality of all such records and
communications." 64
These three cases illustrate the importance of a well-drafted
mediation privilege rule. In the absence of a rule, mediators have no
legal authority on which to assure confidentiality. In jurisdictions with
a rule in place, courts generally follow the plain language of the rule,
whether the result is to restrict the scope of the privilege, such as in
Trejo, or to provide the privilege even in murder cases, such as in
Snyder.
B. Inculpatory Evidence Cases
1. Williams v. State
In the latter part of the 1980s, Georgia courts issued two
seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the admissibility of
statement, the error was harmless. Id.
60. 492 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTs LAW § 849-b(6) (McKinney 2003)).
64. Id. at 892.
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inculpatory evidence. In Williams v. State, a privately negotiated
settlement agreement in which a former employee acknowledged
taking $60,000 and agreed to repay her former employer was admitted
into evidence in her subsequent criminal trial. 65 Recognizing that
admissions made with a view towards compromise are not proper
evidence in civil cases, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed; the
court held that the rule had no application in criminal cases.66
2. Byrd v. State
Surprisingly, two years later in Byrd v. State, the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that a mediated settlement agreement was
inadmissible in a subsequent criminal case.67 In Byrd, the trial court
directed a contractor-the criminal defendant-and a homeowner to
take their dispute to the Neighborhood Justice Center in hopes that a
civil settlement would eliminate the need to proceed with the criminal
matter.68 Although the parties reached an agreement, the contractor
failed to comply with its terms, and the criminal case was set for trial.6 9
At the trial, the mediated agreement was admitted into evidence.7"
Reversing the trial court's decision to admit the agreement, the
Georgia Court of Appeals held the following:
By allowing this alternative dispute resolution effort to be
evidenced in the subsequent criminal trial, the trial court's
ruling eliminates its usefulness. For no criminal defendant will
agree to "work things out" and compromise his position if he
knows that any inference of responsibility arising from what he
says and does in the mediation process will be admissible as an
admission of guilt in the criminal proceeding which will
eventualize if mediation fails.71
In addition, the court found that admission of the mediation

65. 342 S.E.2d 703,704 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
66. Id. (citing Moore v. State, 199 S.E.2d 243, 244 (Ga. 1973)).
67. 367 S.E.2d 300, 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). In Byrd, a homeowner hired a contractor
and paid him $800 to perform certain work in the homeowner's basement laundry room.
Id. at 301. The contractor did not begin work immediately, so the homeowner terminated
the contract and sought a refund of the funds. Id. The criminal division sent the theft-bytaking claim to mediation. Id. at 302. Although the contractor signed an agreement to
repay the homeowner $800 plus interest, he failed to pay, and the criminal case went to
trial. Id.
68. Id. at 302.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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communication raised significant constitutional issues.7 The court
noted that admission of the contested evidence created serious Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment problems of self-incrimination.7 ' The

court reasoned that just as a withdrawn guilty plea is not admissible
against the defendant at trial, the defendant's efforts to comply with
the court-ordered mediation should not be used against him.74 If the

parties cannot work out their differences in mediation, then the
defendant should be able to proceed to trial without any of the prior
discussions being used against him.
The court distinguished Byrd from Williams, stating that the
agreement in Williams was privately negotiated rather than instigated

by the court." The privately negotiated agreement in Williams was
admissible, whereas the court's direction in Byrd rendered the courtordered mediation statements inadmissible.76

72. Id. at 303; see Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or
Foe? A Systemic Look at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667,
685 (2005) ("The constitutional rights of a person accused of a crime and directed into a
restorative process could be violated if she was not given any warning about rights against
self-incrimination and then revealed information which later could be used against her in
court.").
73. Byrd, 367 S.E.2d at 303 ("[D]efendant's mediation-related statements and actions
were not made with any warning of rights against self-incrimination, and yet they were
prompted by court action itself creating a close procedural tie.").
74. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-93(b) (2004)). Although there was no
mediation privilege at the time, the court in Byrd cited to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(e)(6), which "protects statements and conduct made in negotiations and plea
bargains in criminal cases except in very limited circumstances." Id. The court also cited to
the 1987 Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon 1987), and numerous policy reasons, including the
following:
(1) offers of compromise are privileged because public policy encourages the
settlement of disputes without trial; (2) such offers are irrelevant because
they are not intended as admissions; and (3) the negotiation process
establishes express or implied agreements that admissions made during
negotiations will be excluded and courts will enforce those agreements.
Byrd, 367 S.E.2d at 303.
75. Byrd, 367 S.E.2d at 303.
76. Id. Other courts have also held that constitutional issues are implicated when
mediation- and arbitration-related statements are admitted in a criminal case. The court, in
United States v. Gullo, stated that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may be invoked
to dismiss a criminal indictment or to suppress mediation- and arbitration-related
statements when the mediation or arbitration proceeding arises out of state action instead
of private action. 672 F. Supp. 99, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Joshua P. Rosenberg,
Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIO ST.
J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 157, 175-78 (1994) (providing an in-depth analysis of Gullo); Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (holding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
are implicated only if the arbitration process is found to be government action).
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3. Self-Incrimination: ConstitutionalConcerns

As noted by the appellate court in Byrd v. State, the most serious
constitutional question that arises in the context of mediation
confidentiality is the potential violation of a criminal defendant's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.77 The Fifth Amendment
states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself., 78 The U.S. Supreme Court has construed the
Fifth Amendment to protect statements by witnesses that are
compelled, testimonial, and incriminating." Because mediation
statements that raise these types of issues in a subsequent criminal
case will undoubtedly be testimonial and incriminating, the pivotal
issue will be whether the statements made in the course of a courtordered mediation meet the standard for "compelled." 8
Under the Fifth Amendment, the question of compulsion focuses
on whether the witness involuntarily made incriminating statements
due to physical or psychological coercion or in reliance on assurances
given by a Miranda warning."1 The mediation setting does not
generally meet the necessary requisites-custodial interrogation by a
person charged with law enforcement duties-to merit a Miranda
warning." Because mediation does not require a Miranda warning, a
Fifth Amendment challenge to the admissibility of statements must
allege that the court-ordered mediation was so coercive as to render
the participant unable to freely choose whether or not to make the
statements.83
The Supreme Court has held that statements are involuntary any
time the speaker is unable to make a free and rational choice due to a

77. Byrd, 367 S.E.2d at 303. See generally Mary Ellen Reimund, Is Restorative Justice
on a Collision Course with the Constitution?, 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 12-33 (2004)
(discussing the constitutional implications of restorative justice and concluding that
restorative justice is not on a collision course with the Constitution).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
79. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004).
80. One can argue that an order to attend does not equate to an order to respond to
all questions posed. As such, it is highly unlikely that a specific statement made during the
mediation would meet the compelled standard and, thus, would not run afoul of the Fifth
Amendment. The other side of the argument is that when a party is required to participate
in mediation as part of a court order, the involuntary aspect of the mediation process
triggers a Fifth Amendment issue.
81. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476
(1966).
82. See generally Reimund, supra note 3, at 406-07 (providing a more detailed
analysis); Reimund, supra note 77, at 26-28 (same).
83. See Reimund, supra note 77, at 28-29.
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coercive atmosphere.' Cases in which the Court has found
compulsion have largely focused on factors such as being placed in a
police-dominated atmosphere, being cut off from the world, being
subjected to coercive police interrogation procedures, or being faced
with threats of a long incarceration. 5 Thus, the Court has found
compulsion in custodial interrogations, but not necessarily in
situations where facts are simply being gathered.86
Courts that have considered the admissibility of pre-arrest silence
as evidence of guilt have admitted the evidence when the statements
were made without the police being present. In two of these cases,
decided by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits respectively, responses
were given to questions posed by a customs inspector and an
employment supervisor.y
If questioning by a customs inspector or employment supervisor
is not considered compulsion under the Fifth Amendment, then
participation in an arguably less intimidating mediation situation is
unlikely to be considered compelled. The typical mediation
atmosphere is generally more congenial, as it does not restrict the
participant's ability to move freely and does not typically leave the
participant feeling as if he or she was unable to make a free and
rational choice to respond. Even in a court-ordered mediation,
statements are unlikely to be viewed as compelled because the
atmosphere is not typically thought to be threatening-largely
because mandatory attendance does not require disputants to disclose
everything and due to the absence of police presence.
The counter argument is that because a mediation participant
faces potential court sanctions for refusing to participate in the
mediation in "good faith," he or she is compelled to give potentially
self-incriminating testimony in mediation. 8 This argument raises two
interesting issues. First, to what extent must the mediation participant
84. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985).
85. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (determining that the
confession of a suspect who was threatened by police with the possibility of a long
incarceration and the loss of her children was not the product of her voluntary choice
because it was compelled by the psychologically coercive tactics of the interrogators).
86. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
87. See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
silence in response to questioning by customs inspector was admissible); United States v.
Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that silence in response to
employment supervisor's inquiry was admissible).
88. Alexandria Zylstra, The Road from Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory Good
Faith Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW.

69, 87, 93 (2001).
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"participate" in the mediation in order to fulfill his or her good faith
obligation? In Graham v. Baker, for example, the Supreme Court of
Iowa found that a mediation participant's attendance at the session
and statement that his position was "not-negotiable" satisfied the
minimal participation required by the state's mediation statute. 89 It is
important to note that courts vary in both their good faith parameters
and their willingness to impose sanctions for violations of the
requirement of good faith participation in mediation.' In jurisdictions
where such sanctions are imposed, the sanctions are generally court
fees or similar small penalties, 9 which probably do not rise to the
level-such as the threat of lengthy incarceration-needed to
implicate the Fifth Amendment.92
Second, the confidentiality issue can also arise in the context of a
claim for failure to participate in good faith because either the
opposing party or the mediator can bring the party's refusal to
cooperate to the attention of the court; however, this would violate
the confidentiality of the mediation proceedings.93 This situation poses
a significant risk both to the trust the parties place in the mediator and
89. 447 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Iowa 1989).
90. For a collection and discussion of cases in which the courts have either imposed
or refused to impose sanctions for violations of the duty to participate in alternative
dispute resolution, see generally Richard D. English, Annotation, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Sanctions for Failure to Participate in Good Faith in, or Comply with
Agreement Made in, Mediation, 43 A.L.R. 5th 545 (1996). A sampling of these cases
include Zapata v. Zapata, in which the court held that sanctions in the form of a contempt
citation could be imposed against a party in a divorce action for failure to participate in a
mediation. 499 A.2d 905, 908-09 (D.C. 1985). Compare Strandell v. Jackson County, in
which the court held that a federal trial court may not impose contempt citations against a
party for refusing to participate in nonbinding summary jury trials. 838 F.2d 884, 886-88
(7th Cir. 1987). See also Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 989-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that failure to make an offer of settlement satisfactory to plaintiff during a courtordered mediation of automobile collision case was not basis for sanctions). Similarly, a
Texas appellate court held in Hansen v. Sullivan that the trial court improperly imposed
sanctions for failure to participate in good faith against the defendant-dentist in a medical
malpractice suit. 886 S.W.2d 467, 468-69 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
The defendant's participation did not violate the good faith standard because he attended
the mediation for more than three hours and at no time refused to participate. Id. at 468.
91. Where sanctions for violation of the duty of good faith participation in mediation
have been imposed on mediation parties, those "parties have been ordered to pay fees and
costs related to the mediation and [have] been subject to a contempt ruling." Izumi & La
Rue, supra note 20, at 73. For example, Utah imposes sanctions for participants who
violate the requirements of good faith participation in child custody mediation, including
monetary fines "in excess of mediation fees and even a temporary change in custody or
visitation." Zylstra, supra note 88, at 85.
92. Mary A. Shein, Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Siege:
Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 503, 518 (1993).
93. Zylstra, supra note 88, at 96.
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to the mediator's neutrality.9
To illustrate, in Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea
California, Inc., the California Supreme Court refused to allow the
mediator to report sanctionable bad faith conduct from a party during
the course of mediation.95 The holding in Foxgate significantly

diminishes one's ability to argue, at least in California, that the
mediation

process

compels

a

person

to

disclose

potentially

incriminating evidence. Further, this case highlights the tension
between the good-faith standard and confidentiality. 96
However, although cases like Foxgate suggest that mediation
confidentiality and the evolving mediation privilege rules minimize
the threat of sanctions for failing to mediate in good faith, this may do
little to ease the compulsion felt by the ordinary mediation

participant. A party ordered by the court to participate in mediation
may be unaware that his or her failure to participate fully by revealing
all facts known to him or her, including those that may be selfincriminating, will not be immediately reported to the court. As such,

they may enter the mediation fearful, on the one hand, of
incriminating themselves, and on the other, of facing criminal or
monetary sanctions for failing to participate in good faith.
Nonetheless, fear of "phantom" sanctions does not likely meet the
level of compulsion required for Fifth Amendment protection.
94. Patrick Gill, Note, When Confidentiality Is Not Essential to Mediation and
Competing Interests Necessitate Disclosure, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 291, 294 (2006)
("Mediator neutrality is a fundamental principal of mediation because it encourages
effective relationships between the mediator and the parties, as well as maintains the
perception of mediators as unbiased neutrals to the public at large."). See also L.
Randolph Lowry & Peter Robinson, Mediation Confidential, L.A. LAW., May 2001, at 28,
32, which explains the following:
The promise of confidentiality enables disputants to candidly share
information about their circumstances and their legal case that otherwise
would be closely guarded. The mediation process depends upon the sharing
of that information for success in bringing opposing sides together in a
consensual settlement agreement. If mediation confidentiality is not
maintained in a way that supports the confidence of disputants and their
lawyers, they simply will not share information and cases will not settle.
95. 25 P.3d 1117, 1128 (Cal. 2001).
96. But see Sharbono v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 161 P.3d 406, 424-25 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2007). In Sharbono, the trial court allowed the plaintiffs to present evidence of
the defendant's bad faith conduct in the mediation in which the defendant, insurance
company, stated that they would not present a necessary underwriting file unless they were
sued. Id. at 424. This evidence would have otherwise been precluded by the Washington
Mediation Statute's privilege provision; however, the appellate court found that the
privilege did not apply because the defendant was unable to affirmatively show that the
mediation was a result of a court order, a written agreement between the parties, or other
mandate. Id. For a further discussion see Deason, supra note 4, at 45-52.
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III. MEDIATION PRIVILEGE UNDER THE UNIFORM MEDIATION

Acr

The Uniform Mediation Act,' the result of a collaborative effort
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), the American Bar Association (ABA), and the
Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR),98 is intended to promote

candor, encourage resolution of disputes, provide structure and
predictability to the mediation experience, and create uniformity
among the states.99 Several issues addressed by the UMA remain
controversial,"° and to date only ten states and the District of
Columbia have adopted the Uniform Mediation Act since its
inception in 2003.1"1
A. Differences Between Mediation Privilege Under the UMA and
Other Privileges

In contrast to the other commonly recognized privileges (priestpenitent, attorney-client, doctor-patient), ° the mediation privilege
97. UNIF.
MEDIATION
ACT
(2003),
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf.
98. The ACR actively participated in the drafting process, having two members
involved in the drafting meetings and advocating the importance of the ACR's principles.
See generally Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of PrincipledAdvocacy in the Development
of the Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 265 (2002) (discussing in detail the
eleven principles behind the creation of the UMA).
99. UNIF. MEDIATION ACr prefatory note.
100. See Brian D. Shannon, Dancing with the One that "Brung Us"--Why the Texas
ADR Community Has Declined to Embrace the UMA, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 197, 201-15
(2003) (focusing criticisms of the UMA on two primary areas-the UMA's approach to
confidentiality and the complexity of the Act).
101.
See MEDIATION WORKS INC., MODIFICATIONS OF THE UNIFORM MEDIATION
ACT BY STATES THAT HAVE FORMALLY ADOPTED THE UMA AS OF JULY 2007 (2007)

[hereinafter
MEDIATION
WORKS],
available
at
http://www.mwi.org/uma/UMA-Summary-by-Statevl.doc. States that have formally
adopted the Uniform Mediation Act: District of Columbia, D.C. CODE §§ 16-4201 to -4213
(Supp. 2007); Illinois, 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/11-35/99 (2004); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§
679C.101-115 (2005); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2930 to -2942 (2003); New Jersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23C-1 to -13 (West Supp. 2004); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2710.01-.10 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13A-1 to 15 (Supp. 2007); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31c-101 to -114 (Supp. 2007); Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5711-5723 (2006); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.07.010.904 (2006). The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the UMA on January 3, 2008, amending
Idaho Rule of Evidence 507. In re Adoption of New Idaho Rule of Evidence 507, ID Order
08-03 (2008), available at http://www.isc.idaho.gov/rulesfIRE-ordl08.pdf. The Idaho
Legislature passed the UMA Bill, and the governor signed the Bill into law. Uniform
Mediation Act, ch. 35, 2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 35 (2008). Also, New York has a bill pending
to adopt the UMA. S.1967, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
102. See generally Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, supra note
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under the UMA has several distinguishing characteristics, including

that it is held by many individuals. Under the UMA, all mediation
participants, including the mediator, hold the privilege to varying
degrees. Pursuant to UMA section 4(b), the parties,"

the mediator,1"

participants" 5

and even nonparty
(to a limited extent) can each claim
the privilege.' °6 The scope of the privilege depends on who is asserting
its protection, with parties holding the most comprehensive
privilege."° Parties may refuse to disclose and may prevent any other
person from disclosing mediation communications."° The mediator
may refuse to disclose mediation communications and may also stop
others from revealing the mediator's communications.'" Nonparty
24 (providing a detailed discussion on privileges); MCCORMICK, supra note 23, §§ 72-113,
at 338-503 (discussing privileges generally as well as chapters on various privileges);
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,

THE NEW WIGMORE:

A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE,

EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES §§ 6.1-6.2.8, at 439-517 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002)
(discussing the traditional privileges).
103. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(5) (defining mediation party as "a person that
participates in a mediation and whose agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute").
104. Id. § 2(3) (defining mediator as "an individual who conducts a mediation").
105. Id. § 2(4) (defining nonparty participant as "a person, other than a party or
mediator, that participates in a mediation").
106. Id. § 4(b). This subsection provides that the following privileges apply in a
proceeding:
(1) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other
person from disclosing, a mediation communication.
(2) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may
prevent any other person from disclosing a mediation communication of the
mediator.
(3) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any
other person from disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty
participant.
Id.
107. See id.
108. Id. § 2(2) ("'Mediation communication' means a statement, whether oral or in a
record or verbal or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of
considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation
or retaining a mediator.").
109. Id. § 4(b)(2). In the labor context, efforts to compel mediator testimony have
been rejected. See, e.g., NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 55-56 (9th Cir. 1980).
The National Labor Relations Board explained the following regarding labor disputes:
To execute successfully their function of assisting in the settlement of labor
disputes, the conciliators must maintain a reputation for impartiality, and the
parties to conciliation conferences must feel free to talk without any fear
that the conciliator may subsequently make disclosures as a witness in some
other proceeding, to the possible disadvantage of a party to the conference.
If conciliators were permitted or required to testify about their activities, or
if the production of notes or reports of their activities could be required, not
even the strictest adherence to purely factual matters would prevent the
evidence from favoring or seeming to favor one side or the other.
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participants may refuse to disclose mediation communications and
may also deter other individuals from disclosing the nonparty
participant's mediation communication. 0 The most controversial of
these provisions is the mediator as holder of the privilege.1"'
Under the UMA, there are two equally important elements of the
mediator privilege: (1) the mediator's privilege to refuse to testify as
to mediation communications; and (2) the mediator's ability to
preclude others from testifying as to statements made by the mediator
in the course of sessions. 112 The first element of the privilegeallowing the mediator to refuse to testify as to mediation
communications in a subsequent proceeding' 13-is
fundamentally
important to maintaining the parties' perceptions of mediator
neutrality.11 4 Applying the privilege to the mediator protects both the
mediation at issue as well as the mediation process as a whole. The
risk that a mediator may potentially be called to testify in a
subsequent proceeding jeopardizes the mediator's ability to function
effectively as a third party neutral and the mediator's obligation to the
individual parties." 5 Providing the mediator privilege removes doubt
from the minds of the parties that it could be an advantage in
litigation to sway the mediator in his or her favor. The Act specifically
protects the mediator from unwillingly being called as a tie-breaker
witness.116
Moreover, the possibility that the mediator could be called upon
to testify in court in order to settle a dispute as to what transpired
Id. (quoting In re Tomlinson of High Point, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 681, 685 (1947)).
110. UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 4(b)(3).

111. The decision to make the mediator a holder of the privilege almost derailed the
adoption of the UMA in Idaho. Notes from the Evidence Rules Subcommittee on the
UMA (on file with the author). See generally Rufenacht, supra note 8, at 117-22
(discussing the mediator as holder of the privilege).
112.

UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 4(b)(1).

113. Section 2(7) of the UMA broadly defines the term "proceeding": "(A) a judicial,
administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative process, including related pre-hearing and
post-hearing motions, conferences, and discovery; or (B) a legislative hearing or similar
process." Id. § 2(7).
114. UMA section 6(c), comment 12 provides that the mediator may "decline to testify
or otherwise provide evidence in a professional misconduct and mediated settlement
enforcement cases to protect against frequent attempts to use the mediator as a tiebreaking witness, which would undermine the integrity of the mediation process and the
impartiality of the individual mediator." Id. § 6(c) cmt. 12.
115.

Lisa Bench Nieuwveld, Florida Continues to Lead the Nation in Mediation, FLA.

BAR J., July/Aug. 2007, at 48, 49 ("In order for the mediation to have a chance at reaching
a settlement, there are generally two prerequisites: first, the parties must have faith in the
mediation's neutrality and, second, they must trust in the confidentiality of the process.").
116. UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 6(c) cmt. 12 (providing that the mediator may decline
to testify to protect against attempts to use the mediator as a tie-breaking witness).
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during the mediation could lead the parties, whether consciously or
unconsciously, to color their conduct and communications in order to
win favor with the mediator. Certainly each party would have an
interest in having the mediator take a more sympathetic view of his or
her version of events or side of the story." 7 Without the ability to
assert the privilege on the mediator's own behalf, the mediator would
then be placed in the precarious position of choosing between the
parties' conflicting versions of events ' 18 and having his or her
impartiality called into question.119 By preserving such privilege, the
mediator's position as third party neutral is thus protected.
Further, allowing mediators to be called to testify as to mediation
communications could discourage participants and mediators from
engaging in the process with candor and honesty.120 This would risk
erosion of society's trust in the confidentiality of mediation in general.
Under the UMA, the mediator holds the privilege and can choose
whether or not to exercise the privilege 1 2' balancing his or her
obligation to the parties as well as the obligation to the process. In this
way, the mediator ensures that both the parties' interests and society's
trust in the confidentiality of the mediation process are safeguarded.
The second element of the mediator privilege is the mediator's
ability to preclude others from disclosing the mediator's own
statements made in the sessions. From the mediator's perspective, this
portion of the privilege is key to ensuring that the mediator's own
117. The distinction between the roles of mediators and litigators was notable during
the process of drafting the UMA, as mediators sought to highlight conflict resolution
through interest-based discussion and consensus while proponents of the legal system
focused on the road to court and adjudicated results. Richard C. Reuben, The Sound of
Dust Settling. A Response to Criticisms of the UMA, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 99, 106-07
(2003).
118. The chaotic events that transpired during the mediation session at issue in State v.
Williams, 877 A.2d 1258 (N.J. 2005), exemplify the problem. Certainly the "truth" of what
happened was subject to the mediator's interpretation, and for that reason the court
refused to allow the mediator to testify. Id. at 1268, 1270.
119. Hughes, supra note 4, at 37 ("[T]he idea of extending the privilege to the agent or
helper is unique among all of the professional relationships. The argument for a separate
mediator privilege rests upon the continuing need for impartiality.").
120. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note cmt. 1 ("Candor during mediation is
encouraged by maintaining the parties' and mediators' expectations regarding
confidentiality of mediation communications."); In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 636 (4th
Cir. 2002) ("The assurance of confidentiality is essential to the integrity and success of the
Court's mediation program, in that confidentiality ... serves to protect the mediation
program from being used as a discovery tool for creative attorneys.").
121. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)(1)-(2). The mediator's decision whether to
exercise his or her privilege is contingent in part on the other parties and participants
agreeing. See id. § 5. The mediator cannot waive the privilege and disclose mediation
communications unless the parties agree. See id.
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statements will not come back to haunt them, short of a malpractice
action.122 This necessary safeguard prevents situations in which

mediators' words could be misconstrued against them, or even worse,
embroil mediators in heated battles between mediation parties.
Furthermore, this protection facilitates the full and active
participation of qualified mediators in the process; without it,
mediators would likely be more guarded and hesitant
13 to accept
mediations.'
ordered
court
particularly,
more
private and,
The mediation privilege is necessarily different from other
traditionally recognized privileges because of the temporal nature of
the mediator-client relationship and the adversarial and often
contentious nature of the parties' relationship.124 Most other privileges
involve one party and one professional in a direct trust relationship,
for example, doctor-client, priest-penitent, and attorney-client.' In
such trusting relationships, it is natural for the client to feel at ease,
sharing freely and openly with the professional.126 In contrast, in the
mediation relationship, the mediator generally enters without a prior
relationship with either party and needs to develop a relationship as a
neutral third party with at least two people with conflicting interests.127
It is crucial that the parties present as much pertinent information as
possible to reach the most equitable solution, recognizing that
disclosure creates a tension-full disclosure leaves one too vulnerable
and nondisclosure leads to impasse.' Because the mediation
relationship lacks the established foundational trust and confidence
existing in other privilege settings, extending the privilege to the
122. Id. § 6(a)(5) ("There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation
communication that is ... sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of
professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator.").
123. This does not preclude participants from raising concerns about a mediator's
conduct. See id.
124. J. Brad Reich, A Call for Intellectual Honesty: A Response to the Uniform
Mediation Act's Privilege Against Disclosure, 2001 J. DiSP. RESOL. 197, 239-40 (2001)
(arguing that privilege is inappropriate in the mediation context because of the adversarial
nature of the relationships involved). Reich compares the relationships of trust and
confidence where privilege typically arises, such as priest-penitent and psychotherapistpatient, with the adversarial nature of the relationship between mediation parties. Id. at
230-40.
125. Ellen E. Deason, The Need for Trust as a Justification for Confidentiality in
Mediation: A Cross-DisciplinaryApproach, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1387, 1407 (2006).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1408 ("Disclosing communications is inconsistent with this relationship and
normally is not undertaken lightly.").
128. Robert H. Mnookin, Commentary, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A
Comparison of Bilateral and MultilateralNegotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 13-14

(2003).
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mediator enhances the sense of trust in the mediation setting and,
thereby, fosters the parties' communication." 9
An additional distinction between the mediation relationship and
traditional privilege relationships is the amount of risk disclosure
poses for the parties. Although the mediation setting involves the
same "external" risk that one party to any communicative disclosure
will divulge its contents outside the protected relationship, the
presence of the adverse party in the mediation setting adds an
additional or "internal" risk. 3 ' Basically, parties to mediation are
asked to "let their guards down" in order to effectively negotiate with
their adversary during the mediation process. As noted by one author
in a discussion regarding the importance of trust in the mediation
context, "[T]here are significant disclosure risks in mediation that
arise from within the process itself. These internal risks of disclosure
stem from the presence of multiple participants and the fact that their
interests are not aligned in the way that characterizes more typical
privileged settings."'"' It is, however, this distinction from the

traditional paradigm that sets the mediation privilege apart from the
traditional privileges, which do not extend the privilege to the nonclient professional.'32 In order to ease the risks, increased protections,
such as extending the privilege to mediators, are necessary for
mediation communications.
Another unique aspect of the UMA is that it treats oral
agreements as part of the confidential mediation communication and
requires that mediation agreements be formally executed-in writing
and signed by all parties-before they lose the protection of
confidentiality.'33 Even then, only the written agreement falls outside
129. Deason, supra note 125, at 1392. According to Professor Deason:
The mediator is a disinterested third party who intervenes to assist the
negotiators in resolving their conflict by performing a variety of functions
designed to help parties overcome barriers to an agreement. Building trust
between the parties has been described as "[olne of the most obvious and
important [mediator] roles."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Psychological Barriers to
Dispute Resolution, 27 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 255, 292 (1995)).
130. Id. at 1407.
131. Id. at 1408.
132. Id.
133. Rebecca H. Hiers, Navigating Mediation's Uncharted Waters, 57 RUTGERS L.
REV. 531, 555 (2005) (citing UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(1) (2003)). At least one court,
from a non-UMA state, has held that a party must expressly waive the mediation privilege;
a California appellate court held that, under California state law, the mediation privilege,
in contrast to the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges, could not be
impliedly waived. Kieturakis v. Kieturakis, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 119, 137 (Ct. App. 2006). In
Kieturakis, although the party to the divorce action filed suit to amend the child support
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The written agreement can be

"introduced in a subsequent court proceeding.., to determine
whether the terms of that settlement agreement had been
breached.""13 All other mediation communications leading up to the
signing of the document remain subject to the mediation privilege
rule."3
B. Exceptions to Privilege Under the UMA
The UMA provides two categories of exceptions to the general
rule of inadmissibility. The exceptions recognize that society's interest
in protecting confidentiality in mediation may be outweighed by the

justice system's need for evidence in a particular case.'37 Section 6(a)

contains the absolute or the "above the line" exceptions,'38 which
reflect a determination that the justice system's need for the evidence
"categorically outweigh[s] its interest in the confidentiality of
mediation communications.' 3 9 The Section 6(a) exceptions for a
mediation communication include a signed mediated agreement, a
public document, a threat of bodily harm or violent crime, a plan to

commit or conceal criminal activity, the response to a claim of
misconduct or malpractice, and abuse or neglect cases in which child
or adult protective services is a party.
Section 6(b) contains the qualified or the "below the line"
exceptions, 4' which require judges to hold an in camera evidentiary
hearing before a determination is made about the admissibility of the
desired evidence. 142 These exceptions include use of the mediation
provisions of the mediation agreement claiming that he and his ex-spouse had agreed to
terms outside the presence of the mediator, this did not constitute waiver of confidentiality
allowing his ex-spouse to bring forth the mediator as a potential witness. Id. at 122-25.
134. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(1) (2003) ("There is no privilege under Section 4
for a mediation communication that is ...in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by
all parties to the agreement.").
135. Id. § 6 cmt. 2.
136. "The parties may still provide that particular settlement[] agreements are
confidential with regard to disclosure to the general public, and provide for sanctions for
the party who discloses voluntarily." Id.
137. Reuben, supra note 117, at 121 (noting that the exceptions are consistent with
those commonly found in state mediation confidentiality statutes).
138. Id. (noting that during the UMA drafting process, the 6(a) exceptions became
known as the "above the line" exceptions, and the 6(b) exceptions became known as the
"below the line" exceptions).
139. Id.
140. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(1)-(7).
141. Reuben, supra note 117, at 121.
142. Id.

2008]

THE MEDIATOR AS FUG U CHEF

communication in a criminal proceeding and challenges to the
mediated agreement.' 3 These exceptions are applied on a case-by-case

basis, weighing the relative strength of the justice system's need for
the mediation communication against society's interest in protecting
mediation confidentiality.'"

In the criminal context, the state's and the defendant's interests in
evidence supporting guilt or innocence and the parties' and society's

interests in confidentiality are all important. Section 6(b)(1) allows for
otherwise privileged information to be disclosed in subsequent felony,
and possibly misdemeanor, cases' 5 if, after an in camera hearing,' 46 the
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(1)-(2).
144. Id. § 6 cmt 1.
145. Section 6(b)(1)'s balancing process clearly applies to subsequent felony
proceedings and may apply to subsequent misdemeanor proceedings if the state elects to
include that category of cases. See id. § 6 cmts. 9-10. To date ten states and the District of
Columbia have adopted the UMA. See MEDIATION WORKS, supra note 101. Six states
apply the exception to both felonies and misdemeanors. See D.C. CODE § 164205(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31c-106(2)(c)(i) (Supp. 2007); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13A-6(b)(1) (Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23C-6.b(1) (West
Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5717(b)(1) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2710.05(B)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007). Idaho recently adopted the Uniform Mediation
Act with an exception applicable to both felonies and misdemeanors. Uniform Mediation
Act, ch. 35, 2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 35 (2008). Three states limit the exception to felonies
only. See 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/6(b)(1) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.07.050(2)(a)
(2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2935(b)(1) (2003). The bill proposing the Uniform
Mediation Act currently pending in the New York Senate also contains the felony only
exception. S. 1967, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007). See also Reuben, supra note 117, at
123, which explains the UMA drafters' intentions in limiting the misdemeanor exception:
[T]he Act gives states the option of including misdemeanors within this
exception if they so desire as a matter of policy. The drafters declined to
take this step because adding misdemeanors to the exception would have the
effect of diminishing, not increasing, mediation confidentiality. Moreover,
they were particularly concerned about potentially undermining the many
successful victim-offender mediation programs by making victim-offender
mediations more vulnerable to invasion for evidence in subsequent
prosecutions.
146. In Rinaker v. Superior Court, the court recognized the importance of an in
camera viewing, stating "an in camera hearing maintains the confidentiality of the
mediation process" while considering whether factors in the case "compel[] breach of the
confidential mediation process." 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 1998). The process
also allows the court to determine whether the mediator is competent to testify and
whether the information could be introduced without breaching the mediation's
confidentiality. Id. at 472-73. Courts also use an in camera hearing to determine the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. See United States. v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,
574 (1989); Kristen V. Cunningham & Jessica L. Srader, Comment, The Post 9-11 War on
Terrorism... What Does ItMean for the Attorney-Client Privilege?, 4 WYO. L. REV. 311,
320-25 (2004); see also Jennifer L. Hebert, Note, Mental Health Records in Sexual Assault
Cases: Striking a Balance to Ensure a Fair Trial for Victims and Defendants, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1453, 1468 (2005) (discussing in camera review of mental health records); Euphemia
B. Warren, Note, She's Gotta Have It Now: A Qualified Rape Crisis Counselor-Victim
143.

SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:943

court determines that the desired evidence is otherwise unavailable,
and the need for the information in the particular case substantially
outweighs the interest in protecting mediation confidentiality.147 The
criminal proceedings exception applies to both exculpatory and
inculpatory evidence.'48

The UMA's adoption of an ex-post facto balancing test is
controversial. One commentator explains that allowing courts to apply
these balancing tests is problematic because the potential admissibility
of such statements is not determined until after a party has made
them.49 This type of uncertainty places the parties in a very precarious
position because they may not be aware of the potential adverse
criminal consequences until later."' Although the UMA sought to
provide "greater certainty in judicial interpretation"'' in the use of
mediation communications in subsequent criminal proceedings, it has
not accomplished this goal. The commentator notes that it is precisely
this type of uncertainty that has led the Supreme Court to reject such
after-the-fact exceptions to other privileges, including the attorneyclient and psychotherapist-patient privileges. "2
The UMA drafters' decision to use the substantially outweighs
Privilege, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 149 (1995) (discussing in camera inspection of
confidential rape counseling records).
147. UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 6(b)(1).
148. Id. § 6(b)(1) cmt. 10 ("It is drafted in a manner to ensure that both the
prosecution and the defense have the same right with respect to evidence, thus assuring a
level playing field."); Reuben, supra note 117, at 122 ("In the felony context, the exception
permits evidence affecting someone's physical liberty, and possibly their life, as well as the
public's interest in safety and the enforcement of society's most serious criminal laws-if
that evidence is really necessary in the case and is otherwise unavailable.").
149. Hiers, supra note 133, at 583.
150. Id.
151. UNIF. MEDIATION ACr § 4 cmt. 2.
152. Hiers, supra note 133, at 583-84 (citing Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524
U.S. 399, 409 (1998) (rejecting the use of a balancing test in defining the contours of the
attorney-client privilege)); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1996) (citing Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)) (noting that the uncertainty in after-the-fact
balancing risks undermining the psychotherapist-patient privilege). The Supreme Court in
Jaffee explained the problem with in camera reviews:
Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later
evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and
the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the
privilege. As we explained in Upjohn, if the purpose of the privilege is to be
served, the participants in the confidential conversation "must be able to
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all."
Id. (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393).
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standard raises the bar in favor of protecting mediation
communications, making it more difficult to overcome the privilege. "3
Not all scholars support this standard as an appropriate balance of the
competing societal interests. This decision has been criticized by at
least one scholar as placing the confidentiality interest above the

interests of justice and of the constitutional rights of the accused.'
That scholar advocates altering the standard to reflect the anticipated
infrequency of the exception's invocation."' However, focusing solely
on the scarcity of prior case law in this area ignores the increased use
of mediation to resolve criminal disputes56 and misapprehends the

consequences to the mediation process if parties lose faith in
confidentiality. No doubt, the qualified exception will become the
subject of future litigation as courts are called upon to interpret the
substantially outweighs standard.'57

The drafters of the UMA recognized that "society's need for
evidence to avoid an inaccurate decision is greatest in the criminal
context., 15 8 They stated that, even without an exception for criminal
matters, "the courts can be expected to weigh heavily the need for the
evidence in a particular case, and sometimes will rule that the
defendant's constitutional rights require disclosure."' 59 Therefore,
153. Davisson, supra note 17, at 709 (noting that the determination of whether the
need for the specific evidence substantially outweighs the general need for confidentiality
will be determined on a case by case basis). Under the UMA standard, the interest in
confidentiality will be weighed from a macro perspective while the need for the
information will be weighed from a micro perspective. Id.
154. Id. at 683. The commentator argues that "the UMA's qualified privilege for civil
mediation communications is unconstitutional as applied to criminal proceedings, or at the
very least undesirable from a justice perspective." Id. He further criticizes the UMA
section on criminal proceedings, asserting that the UMA's privilege standard under the
criminal proceedings exception is unconstitutional because it is weighed toward
inadmissibility and therefore violative of individuals' Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation. Id. at 687.
155. Id. at 718.
156. Laflin, supra note 9, at 573-74.
157. See Hiers, supra note 133, at 578-79 ("This potential criminal proceedings
exception could become one of the most controversial issues in emerging mediation law.");
Davisson, supra note 17, at 698 ("Whether application of mediation privileges is
appropriate in criminal proceedings and to what extent they should apply.., is by far the
most controversial question in this area because the answer carries with it the greatest of
implications.").
158. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(1) cmt. 10 (2003); see also Folb v. Motion Picture
Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Although the
Court need not, and indeed may not, address the outer limits of a federal mediation
privilege, it seems appropriate to note one potential limitation here. A federal mediation
privilege may be attenuated of necessity in criminal or quasi-criminal cases where the
defendant's constitutional rights are at stake.").
159. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(1) cmt. 10.
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courts must determine, on an individual case basis,' 6° whether the
confidentiality assurances provided in most mediations trump the
need for evidence in a criminal prosecution. 6
The concern that adversaries will hear potentially incriminating
statements is less of a problem for mediators who do not hold joint
sessions. By conducting their mediations exclusively in private
caucuses, mediators ensure that the parties are never present with one
another in the same room, thereby eliminating the possibility of the
162
adverse parties hearing exculpatory or inculpatory statements.

While this method may work in certain types of cases and for some
mediators, the UMA seeks to create a uniform rule that applies to all

mediations. Some mediators never use caucuses, others selectively use
them, while others almost exclusively use them. Requiring all
mediations to be conducted in private caucuses would run contrary to
many mediators' practice and adversely change the collaborative
163
nature of many mediations.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE UMA TO THE FIVE PRE-UMA CASES
How would the results of the five previously discussed cases be
affected if they had been decided under the UMA? Analysis of the

admissibility of mediation communications in subsequent criminal
proceedings must address two fundamental questions: (1) who is the
holder of the privilege, and (2) how important is the desired
information to the case.
A. Holders of the Privilege
The issue determinative of the admissibility question in the Trejo
160. Id. ("After great consideration and public comment, the Drafting Committees
decided to leave the critical balancing of these competing interests to the sound discretion
of the courts to determine under the facts and circumstances of each case.").
161. Reimund, supra note 3, at 425 (discussing Section 6(b)(1)'s balancing test in the
victim-offender context).
162. Mediators would still have to grapple with whether to report certain mediation
communications, such as child abuse, future crimes, etc.
163. See generally Pamela F. Olson & David B. Robison, Recently Developed IRS
Audit and Dispute Resolution Techniques, 796 PLI/Tax 841 (2007) (discussing the IRS's
collaborative mediation process); Hanan M. Isaacs & Jennifer L.B. Katz, New Jersey Ethics
Opinion Will Alter How Neutrals Operate at Mediation Centers, Highlighting the Nature
and Structure Not Only of Their Relationships, but also the Parties' Obligations, 25
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 150, 151 (2007) (noting that clients select mediation
centers for their divorces because they use a collaborative process); P. Oswin Chrisman et
al., Collaborative Practice Mediation: Are We Ready to Serve this Emerging Market?, 6
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 451, 454 (2006) (discussing collaborative law practice).
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case is who is the holder of the privilege. Under the UMA, Trejo's
wife, as a party to the custody mediation, would have been allowed to

assert the privilege in the subsequent criminal proceeding.'6 Unlike
Idaho's privilege rule, the UMA does not require one to be a party in

the subsequent criminal action in order to assert the privilege."

As a

party to the custody mediation, the wife could have refused to disclose
and may have prevented another (in this case the mediator) from
disclosing particular mediation communications.' 66 Further, the
defendant's desire to waive the privilege would not overcome the

wife's assertion of the privilege.'67
The UMA also makes it clear that the mediator could not have

been compelled to testify about the wife's statements even if both
parties to the mediation waived the privilege." Under the UMA, the

policies behind providing the mediators the right to assert the
privilege are to ensure that parties will participate fully and candidly
in the mediation process and to encourage competent and eligible
mediators to participate in the process. 6 9 The UMA allows the
mediator to choose whether he or she wants to claim the privilege.'7 °
The parties hold their privilege separate from that of the mediator,

and their waiver does not affect the mediator's choice to assert his or

164. UNIF. MEDIATION ACr § 4(b)(1) ("A mediation party may refuse to disclose,
and may prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication.").
165. Compare IDAHO R. EVID. 507 (defining the privilege narrowly to apply only
when the one asserting the privilege is a party to civil or criminal proceeding), with UNIF.
MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)(1) (defining the privilege broadly to apply in any situation).
166. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)(1); id. § 4 cmt. 4 ("The mediation privilege of the
parties draws upon the purpose, rationale, and traditions of the attorney-client privilege, in
that its paramount justification is to encourage candor by the mediation parties, just as
encouraging the client's candor is the central justification for the attorney-client
privilege.").
167. Id. § 4 cmt. 4. Conversely, "if all parties agree that a party should testify about a
party's mediation communications, no one else may block them from doing so, including a
mediator or nonparty participant." Id. Thus, the mediator and the nonparty participant can
only block a party from testifying as to the mediator's or nonparty participant's mediation
communication. Id.
168. Id. § 6(c) ("A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation
communication referred to in subsection (a)(6) [professional misconduct or malpractice
actions filed against a mediation participant] or (b)(2) [a proceeding to challenge the
validity of a contract arising from the mediation].").
169. Id. § 4(b), cmt. 4 ("Mediators are made holders.., so that they will not be viewed
as biased in future mediations .... "). But see United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1009
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the attorney-client privilege runs with the client, not the
attorney). It is unclear whether, in light of the UMA, the federal courts will make the
mediator the holder of the privilege.
170. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)(2).
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her privilege.' As such, the parties cannot force a mediator to waive
the privilege under the UMA.
B. Exculpatory and Inculpatory Cases: The BalancingAct

The central question in the five cases discussed above-the
admissibility of mediation communications in subsequent criminal
cases' 72 -is addressed by UMA Section 6(b)(1): the "below the line"
exception requiring the court to conduct a balancing test.173 In reality,
courts will address the micro level-whether justice requires the
information from the mediation in that particular case-before ever
moving to the macro level-whether the need for the information
substantially outweighs the need to preserve confidentiality. If a
statement fails to meet the micro standard, the court need not proceed
to the macro issue. Thus, the balancing test will only be used once a
court determines that a significant need for the evidence has been
established.
1. Exculpatory Cases
How would or should a court decide exculpatory cases today
under the UMA's qualified privilege standard? 74 In addition to

looking at the usual indicia of reliability such as relevance and
hearsay, 175 the timing of the exculpatory statements may become a
crucial factor in balancing the defendant's need for the evidence with
the public's interest in protecting confidentiality. Exculpatory
statements made after the criminal act can be fraught with reliability
concerns. In contrast, statements made prior to the criminal act may
171. See id. § 4(b).
172. Several jurisdictions that do not have a criminal proceedings exception have
recognized a strong interest in protecting mediation communications. See, e.g., Williams v.
State, 770 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.) ("[This court]
can not consider any evidence from the dispute resolution procedure that appellant and
complainant participated in prior to his arrest, as disclosures made in an ADR procedure
are confidential, and not subject to disclosure." (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon Supp. 1989))); United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 104
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (concluding that statements made during a dispute resolution proceeding
must be suppressed at the criminal trial).
173. Reuben, supra note 117, at 121 (noting that exceptions under Section 6(b) are
"below the line" exceptions whereas Section 6(a) contains the "above the line"
exceptions).
174. Davisson, supra note 17, at 724 ("[T]he criminal proceedings exception should be
extended to permit the admissibility of any otherwise admissible evidence that is
exculpatory in nature (i.e., a categorical exception).").
175. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 801-804 (rules regarding relevance and hearsay).

2008]

THE MEDIATOR AS FUG U CHEF

be more probative and relevant to a defendant's claim of self-defense
especially if they evidence imminent danger."6 Defendants and victims
have less of a motive to skew their statements toward their selfinterest prior to the bad acts; whereas, they would have more motive
after the criminal act has been committed. Therefore, courts will need
to consider the timing and context of the exculpatory statements in
addition to the other indicia of reliability, when determining their
admissibility.
State v. Williams, which was heard on appeal after New Jersey
adopted the UMA, and State v. Trejo concerned potentially
exculpatory statements made in a mediation setting after the alleged
criminal act.177 The timing was similar in each: the criminal act
occurred, charges were filed, potentially exculpatory statements were
made in mediation, and then the criminal case came to trial.7
Exculpatory statements made after the fact can have low probative
value as they are often a reaction to the event and not relevant as to
motive.179 In contrast, exculpatory statements made before the act
occurs may show motive, especially if the statements are credible and
threaten imminent harm against the defendant.8
In Trejo, the husband had already shot his sister-in-law's
boyfriend before he and his wife attempted to mediate their divorce
and custody dispute.' By the time the custody matter came to
mediation, the wife was no longer just angry at her husband for
misusing his visitation time, she was no doubt also furious that he had
shot her sister's boyfriend."" Her statements made weeks or months
after the criminal act were less probative of his self-defense claim
because the criminal act was a significant intervening event that could
176. See Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 194 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). The court explained
the requirement that a self-defense claim include imminent danger:
[Even if a] defendant... actually and reasonably believe[s] that, sooner or
later, his enemy will choose an opportune moment to attack and kill him...
the law does not allow a defendant to seek out and kill his enemy .... The
defendant's use of force against his enemy is authorized only when the
defendant actually and reasonably believes that the enemy's threatened
attack is imminent.
Id.
177. State v. Williams, 877 A.2d 1258, 1261 (N.J. 2005); State v. Trejo, 979 P.2d 1230,
1235 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999); see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23 C-1 to -13 (West Supp. 2007).
178. Williams, 877 A.2d at 1260; Trejo, 979 P.2d at 1233, 1235.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Radtke, 415 F.3d 826, 840-41 (8th Cir. 2005).
180. See, e.g., Davisson, supra note 17, at 700 n.107 (discussing a case where the
defendant subpoenaed a mediator's testimony concerning the victim's statements in
mediation to support a self-defense claim).
181. Trejo, 979 P.2d at 1233, 1235.
182. Id. at 1235.
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have prompted the comment. Thus, under a UMA analysis, the postcriminal act statements in Trejo would probably fail on the micro
level-the need for the information-and never reach the second
prong of the balancing test.
The more recent case, State v. Williams, provides further
refinement for the admissibility analysis concerning post-crime
mediation statements." 3 In Williams, the issue on appeal was whether
a court-appointed mediator may testify in a subsequent criminal
proceeding regarding a participant's statements made during
mediation.' 84 While the appellate division affirmed the defendant's
conviction, it acknowledged that the mediator's testimony could
potentially have helped the defendant establish a self-defense claim,
"a key defense contention. '' 8' The New Jersey Supreme Court held, in
a split decision, that the court-appointed mediator in the civil
harassment action could not testify in the subsequent criminal
proceeding186regarding the alleged victim's statements made during the
mediation.
Although the underlying situation arose prior to the state's
enactment of the UMA, the New Jersey Supreme Court used the
UMA as "an appropriate analytical framework" in determining
whether the defendant could overcome the mediator's privilege not to
testify. 7 The court noted that the defendant had the burden to
establish that he satisfied each of the three conditions in the balancing
test: (1) the mediation communication is sought in a criminal
proceeding; (2) the need for the evidence "substantially outweighs the
interest in protecting confidentiality"; and (3) the evidence is not
available otherwise.'
While the court discussed all three
requirements, it focused primarily on the substantially outweighs
provision, concluding that "the mediator's testimony was not
sufficiently probative to strengthen [the] defendant's assertion of selfdefense.' 189 The court considered the public policy of preserving
183. Williams, 877 A.2d at 1265.
184. Id. at 1260.
185. Id. at 1262.
186. Id. at 1270.
187. Id. at 1265.
188. Id. at 1264-65 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23C-6b (West Supp. 2007)).
189. Id. at 1269. The court found the mediator's statement in this case to be
particularly unreliable, noting that the mediation participants were "talking at the same
time" and describing the environment as bedlam. Id. at 1268. Further, although he stated
that he was not friends with the defendant, the mediator's trustworthiness was
questionable in the court's eyes in light of the fact that the mediator had conferred with the
defendant outside of court and by his very presence and willingness to testify. Id.
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mediation as a forum for dispute resolution and held that the
"defendant's need for the mediator's testimony [did] not outweigh the
interest in protecting mediation confidentiality.' 90 Thus, the court's
decision focused primarily on the micro level before turning briefly to
the macro level.
In addition, the court found that the defendant had not satisfied
the third condition that the evidence was not otherwise available. 19'
According to the court, there were other eyewitnesses available to
testify and both parties had access to other additional evidence."
Because the defendant did not meet the conditions necessary to
overcome the confidentiality of the mediation proceeding, the New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decision to refuse
the testimony of the mediator.9 Although not the basis of the court's
ruling, Williams supports the proposition that post-criminal act
exculpatory statements are less likely to "substantially outweigh" the
need to protect mediation confidentiality.
The defendant in Williams also claimed that the UMA's
substantially outweighs requirement in criminal proceedings created
"an unconstitutional evidentiary restriction."'94 The defendant argued
that the court should impose a less onerous burden on him in deciding
whether the need for the mediation communication outweighed the
rejected defendant's
interests.'95 The court
confidentiality
constitutional claims, stating that the defendant "received that which
the Confrontation Clause guarantees: 'an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective
96 in whatever
way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.""
Unlike the Trejo and Williams cases, which concerned
exculpatory statements made after the crime had occurred,' 9' in State
v. Castellano, the victim's life threatening statement was made in a
190. Id. at 1269.
191. Id. at 1270.
192. Id. at 1269-70. For example, the defendant's wife testified about the defendant's
confession, and excerpts of the defendant's statement to the police were admitted. Id.
193. Id. at 1270.
194. Id. at 1265.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1270 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). But see Gill,
supra note 94, at 303 (disagreeing with the majority's decision in State v. Williams). "When
confidentiality is used to prevent the defendant in a criminal proceeding from presenting a
complete defense, the interests in preserving mediation confidentiality must give way to
overwhelming Constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants and allow that evidence
to be presented." Id.
197. State v. Trejo, 979 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999); Williams, 877 A.2d at
1260.
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mediation session prior to the criminal act.98 The defendant's right to
a fair opportunity to present a defense may well prevail in pre-UMA
cases, especially if the threat is imminent. In such a situation, courts
must focus on both the micro and macro levels. An in camera review
of the evidence allows the court to examine the reliability of the
proffered testimony before deciding whether to allow it into evidence.
However, assuming that the threat was credible and imminent, the
defendant's need for pre-criminal act statements supporting his claim
of self-defense could substantially outweigh the need to protect
mediation confidentiality. In these circumstances, a defendant's
constitutional rights could very well override the interest of mediation
confidentiality.
Some statutes, such as the one governing New York's community
dispute resolution centers, provide stronger protection for mediation
confidentiality in the criminal arena than the UMA does.' 99 Under the
UMA, the court in Synder would have been required to make an in
camera review of the potentially exculpatory evidence and then
determine whether the interests of confidentiality would be
"substantially outweighed" by the need for the evidence.2 While New
York's protection of confidentiality in criminal mediations is laudable,
the lack of uniformity diminishes its value. Uniformity is one of the
UMA's major contributions.
2. Inculpatory Cases
When the defendant admits to past criminal behavior in a
mediation session conducted for the purpose of settling the matter,
defendant's inculpatory statements should generally not be admissible
in a subsequent criminal case."' In Byrd, the State sought to use the
defendant's statements from the court-ordered mediation in the
subsequent criminal trial.2 2 Applying a UMA analysis to the facts in
Byrd raises two issues-one with respect to the admissibility of the
mediated agreement and the other with respect to communications
made during the course of the mediation.
As to the mediated agreement, Section 6(a)(1) of the UMA
provides that an agreement signed by all parties memorializing the

198. State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
199. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b (McKinney 2003).
200. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b) (2003).
201. Davisson, supra note 17, at 724 ("[A]ny criminal proceedings exception should
not apply to mediation communications that originate from a 'criminal mediation."').
202. Byrd v. State, 367 S.E.2d 300, 302-03 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
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parties' resolution is not privileged 0 3 Even though the signed

mediated agreement loses its privileged status, it can remain
confidential. 2"' This being so, mediators, especially those conducting

criminal mediations or mediations designed to resolve a criminal
matter, need to take note from civil law practitioners who do not
include admissions in their settlement agreements. In Byrd, the
defendant could have avoided having incriminating statements
memorialized in the non-privileged document and later used as

evidence against her by agreeing to pay the amount in question
without admitting to the underlying crime in the mediated agreement.
Similarly, in Williams v. State, the defendant could have agreed to

pay $60,000 without admitting to embezzlement in the settlement
document. °5 With the stakes so high in criminal mediations, courts
should seriously consider appointing counsel

to represent the

defendant in court-mandated mediations or, at the very least, ensure
that the mediators are skilled enough to omit admissions from
mediated agreements.2
Even though a signed settlement agreement is admissible under
the UMA, all other nonexempt mediation communications should
remain privileged. Without this assurance, defendants could suffer
severe consequences2° and thus would have little incentive to

203. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(1) ("There is no privilege under Section 4 for a
mediation communication that is... in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all
parties to the agreement.").
204. Id. § 6(a)(1) cmt. 2 ("The exception permits such an agreement to be introduced
in a subsequent court proceeding convened to determine whether the terms of that
settlement agreement had been breached."). The comment section does not discuss the
situation in Byrd where the agreement is sought to establish one of the parties' guilt. See id.
205. 342 S.E.2d 703, 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). The agreement could have also been
framed as an Alford Plea. Under an Alford Plea, the defendant would not have to admit to
the act and could continue to assert innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
37-38 (1970). The defendant, however, admits that sufficient evidence exists with which
the prosecution could likely convince a judge or jury to find the defendant guilty. See id.
206. To resolve a criminal mediation, the defendant may have to admit guilt in order
to get the court to agree to the terms of the settlement. However in diversion programs,
where the criminal matter will be dismissed if the parties come to a mutually agreeable
resolution, the agreement need not include an admission of guilt. See generally Elizabeth
Goussetis, Prosecutor Candidates Debate Pros, Cons of Diversion, Mediation, ATHENS
MESSENGER,

Feb.

29,

2008,

http://athensmessenger.com/Main.asp?SectionlD=1 &ArticlelD=8810.
207. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(1) ("There is no privilege under Section 4 for a
mediation communication that is... in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all
parties to the agreement.")
208. Hiers, supra note 133, at 585 ("A defendant, who attempts conciliation through
taking responsibility for prior harmful conduct, may face severe consequences for doing
so.").
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participate in any conciliation efforts. Mediation should not be used to
put the state in a better position than it would have been in but for the
mediation. The state has the burden to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt and should not be allowed to use mediation
communications to meet its burden. °0 Prosecutors should not be
allowed to use mediation as a means to gain a strategic advantage.21
These desired communications would not exist but for the parties'
settlement attempts.21
Mediators must be impartial and at the same time be guardians of
the process.212 The mediator must not be co-opted as a pawn of the
state. 13 As such, mediators have an obligation to not allow the process
to leave one of the parties in a worse position than he or she would
have been in but for the mediation. Resolutions must be mutually
beneficial and should not provide the state with the bonus of a
confession if something goes awry later. Thus, the state's desire for
inculpatory evidence obtained from criminal or quasi-criminal
mediations should generally not substantially outweigh the benefits
the community gets from mediated agreements.
Unfortunately, the UMA is not explicit about the specific
applicability of confidentially in the context of criminal matters and, at
this point, UMA jurisdictions will resolve such questions through the
balancing test. In contrast, the Oregon Legislature has adopted a
209. See generally Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the
Confrontation Clause: A Proposalfor a ProsecutorialRestraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV.
557, 613 (1992) ("The failure to hold statements elicited by the prosecution to a higher
standard of admissibility defeats the objective of protecting the individual against the
power of the government and interferes with the jury's historical function of guarding our
civil liberties.").
210. See Carter, supra note 20, at 372. While Carter was not specifically discussing
criminal matters, his argument is particularly relevant in the criminal context.
211. Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The
Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 38 (1986) ("Compromise
negotiations often require the admission of facts which disputants would never otherwise
concede.").
212. See generally Boettger, supra note 20 (arguing against the imposition of a goodfaith requirement on participants in mandatory mediation, and noting the mediator's role
as guardian of the mediation process). "The mediator's neutral role ensures that he or she
will not take a stand for or against one side when resolving the dispute. The mediator
maintains responsibility for the process and adapting it to the parties' needs." Id. at 16. See
also Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 575, 601 (1997) (stating that the mediator is in
control of the process).
213. See Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality:
Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 82 (2001) ("[I]f a
mediator can be converted into the opposing party's weapon in court, then her neutrality is
only temporary and illusory.").
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broad confidentiality provision dealing specifically with confidentiality
2 ' Under
in criminal matters entitled "Mediating Criminal Offenses.""

Oregon law, parties in a criminal mediation "must be informed... [o]f
the right to enter into a written agreement concerning confidentiality
of the mediation proceedings; and . . . [t]hat mediation
communications or agreements may not be used as an admission of
guilt or as evidence against the offender in any adjudicatory
proceeding."2 5' Thus, the parties' written confidentiality agreement

precludes a court from receiving into evidence any mediation
communications or mediated agreement.216 This provision removes the
uncertainty currently existing under the UMA in the area of criminal
mediations. At the same time, because this law is specific to Oregon, it
lacks the advantage of uniformity.
The hope is that courts will use the substantially outweighs
standard in weighing evidence from criminal mediations to uphold the
privilege and exclude inculpatory evidence. This would prove

beneficial to both participants and the criminal justice system as it
would

encourage

mediation

of criminal

matters

and protect

defendants' constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
3. CriminalMediations and the Balancing Test Under the UMA

Some scholars question the wisdom of applying Section 6(b)(1)'s
balancing test to communications from criminal mediations. 17 While

there is merit to the argument for fortifying the protections given to
these communications, the pragmatic response is that such changes
are unlikely to occur under the UMA. The UMA was five years in the

making, and significant amendments are unlikely within the
framework of the uniform act." 8 Therefore, it is incumbent upon
courts to consider the purpose of the mediation when balancing the
evidence.
214.

OR. REV. STAT. §§ 135.951-959 (2005).

215. Id. § 135.957.
216. Id. The statute provides some limited exceptions.
217. Davisson, supra note 17, at 724 ("[A]ny criminal proceedings exception should
not apply to mediation communications that originate from a 'criminal mediation."');
Teninbaum, supra note 21, at 64 (suggesting that communications from criminal
mediations should be privileged if the matter has not reached settlement).
218. Reuben, supra note 117, at 100 (noting that the UMA was the result of "five years
of research, drafting, and vetting"). As noted in the UMA Prefatory Comments, a central
goal of the UMA was to provide uniformity. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note cmts.
(2003). NCCUSL would not consider a state statute to be part of the UMA if it gave
mediation communications absolute protection from use in subsequent criminal
proceedings (notes on file with author from conversation with member of NCCUSL).
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If the judicial system wants to encourage the resolution of
criminal actions through victim offender programs or other criminal
mediation programs, then the parties must feel free to fully participate
without concern that what they say may come back to haunt them in a
subsequent criminal proceeding.21 9 If parties to criminal mediations
come to believe that their statements can be used against them, they
will be reluctant to participate. Victims will feel further victimized,
and defendants will feel entrapped. Both will result in fewer people
using criminal mediations to resolve their disputes. Accordingly, when
courts turn to the macro level of the balancing test, they should be
mindful of the benefits associated with criminal mediations.
V. DUTY TO WARN PARTICIPANTS OF LIMITATIONS ON
CONFIDENTIALITY

Given this lack of clarity and predictability, do mediators in
UMA jurisdictions have an ethical obligation to inform participants
about the limitations on confidentiality-and in particular of the
possibility that statements made during the course of mediation may
be admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings?
While many mediators recognize that a blanket assertion that all
mediation communications are confidential is misleading, few
mediators provide participants with a detailed explanation of the
limits to confidentiality. Most opt for a generic confidentiality
statement such as "mediation communications are generally
privileged." They do this for a variety of reasons: (1) they do not want
to dissuade the participants from fully engaging in the process;22° (2)
the chances of mediation communications having any relevance in a
subsequent criminal proceeding are rare, especially in non-criminal
mediations; (3) mediators are uncertain themselves as to the
parameters of mediation privilege; and (4) most participants will not
understand the limits on confidentiality, and thus it is not worth
risking the confusion by attempting to explain something that very
likely will not occur.
While each of these justifications has some merit, mediators still
219. See generally Reimund, supra note 77 (regarding the constitutional implications
of restorative justice); Ilyssa Wellikoff, Note, Victim-Offender Mediation and Violent
Crimes: On the Way to Justice, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2003) (regarding
victim-offender mediation and more serious cases).
220. A participant who understands that the confidential nature of the mediation may
not prevent statements from being used against him or her in later litigation may be
reluctant to participate candidly in the mediation, thereby minimizing the chances of
reaching a fair and comprehensive settlement. See Hiers, supra note 133, at 585.
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must determine whether they have an ethical obligation to warn
participants about the criminal proceedings exception. Surely they do.
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators assists with the
analysis of the ethical question,"' and the UMA provides guidance on
222
the scope of the warning.
A fundamental tenet of mediation is party self-determination.2
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators defines selfdetermination as "the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced
decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to
process and outcome., 224 In order to make free and informed choices,
participants need to know the parameters of confidentiality before
they enter into the mediation process. Parties enter mediation because
they are in conflict. As such, the participants generally are in an
adversarial relationship with one another and, thus, do not enter the
process with each other's best interest in mind. Accordingly, it is
imperative that each participant understands that nothing in
mediation is necessarily confidential or privileged. In addition, there
may be constitutional ramifications for participants who, erroneously
believing that they are fully protected by confidentiality, make selfincriminating statements in the course of mediation-particularly in
criminal mediations. 25
The obligation to warn, however, must be juxtaposed against the
consequences of providing such a warning. Warnings could discourage
full, candid, and honest participation. 226 After such a warning,
221.

MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS pmbl. (2005), available at

http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model standards-conduct-april207.pdf. In 2005,
the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, and the Association
for Conflict Resolution approved the revised set of mediation ethics standards. See id.
222, Susan Nauss Exon, How Can a Mediator Be Both Impartial and Fair?: Why
Ethical Standards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 387, 393
(2006) (noting that the UMA provides no guidance about mediators' ethical obligations
because it is a privilege rule, as opposed to an ethical code of conduct).
223. Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice, Give Thanks, and Sing: ABA, ACR,
and AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L.

195, 220-25 (2006) (discussing self-determination under the revised Standards); Nancy A.
Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the
history of self-determination and its changing nature in court-connected mediations).
224. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I.A.
225. See Reimund, supra note 3, at 406-07 ("A criminally accused person's
constitutional rights may be jeopardized if he is directed to mediation by the court, not
given any warning about rights against self-incrimination, and then the court uses evidence
of admissions made during the mediation."); Reimund, supra note 72, at 85-86.
226. Hiers, supra note 133, at 584-85. The author argues that in states that have
adopted the criminal proceedings exception, "attorneys and mediators probably should
make sure that the parties know that statements they make during a mediation may be
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participants could become hesitant to reveal any information that
could possibly be used to injure their credibility, incriminate them, or

implicate them in some future criminal trial. As such, warning
participants of the limits of confidentiality could inhibit full disclosure.

Even with the potential adverse consequences, mediators must
stop

making

broad

and

misleading

assertions

concerning

confidentiality. Mediators need to explain the interplay between
mediation communications and subsequent criminal proceedings and
inform participants that there is a chance, although slim, that what
they say in mediation may be used against them in subsequent

proceedings. 27 This notice is consistent with the criminal proceedings
exception of the UMA. 22" Although the substantially outweighs

standard requires courts to tip the scale in favor of upholding the
privilege and excluding the evidence, the Act is relatively new, and
therefore it is hard to predict how courts will apply this standard to

particular facts.
As previous noted, only one court, State v. Williams, has
discussed Section 6(b)(1)'s balancing test, and that case resulted in a
split decision. 29 In time, courts, having applied the standard to a

broader array of factual scenarios, will provide a fuller understanding
of how this exception will apply, and mediators will be better

equipped to explain it to mediation participants. In the meantime,
however, mediators need to acknowledge the limitations to
confidentiality, noting that the chances of the exception applying in
the context of a civil mediation are relatively unlikely. Mediators can
used later to prosecute them in criminal proceedings." Id. at 584. She also acknowledges
any such warnings "likely would chill meaningful discussion of any conduct which could
trigger both civil and criminal actions." Id. at 585.
227. Requiring mediators to explain the limits of confidentiality to the participants is
consistent with some of the ethical codes of conduct for mediators. See, e.g., MODEL
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (2000), available at

http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/modelstandards.pdf. Standard III.A.8 provides in part:
"Before family mediation begins a mediator should provide the participants with an
overview of the process and its purposes, including.., describing the obligations of the
mediator to maintain the confidentiality of the mediation process and its results as well as
any exceptions to confidentiality." Id. Standard III.A.8. Standard VII.B provides in part:
"Prior to undertaking the mediation the mediator should inform the participants of the
limitations of confidentiality such as statutory, judicially or ethically mandated reporting."
Id. Standard VII.B. See also CALIF. DISPUTE RESOLUTION COUNCIL'S STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE
FOR
CALIF.
MEDIATORS
§
4.A,
available
at
http://www.sbcadre.org/neutrals/ethicsmed.htm ("If a Mediator or the law has established
specific exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality, these exceptions must be disclosed
to the participants prior to reaching an agreement to mediate.").
228. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(1) (2003).
229. 877 A.2d 1258, 1265 (N.J. 2005).
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then proceed with the mediation feeling confident that all participants

are fully informed.
VI. CONCLUSION

The UMA, the product of five years of research and debate, is a

major step forward for the mediation community. While it has its
critics, numerous proponents recognize its tremendous strengths231the most notable is providing uniformity among the states.f2 In spite
of its length and depth of coverage, the Act does not provide a
blueprint or reliable prediction for how courts will decide cases
involving the qualified exceptions.
The UMA provides limited guidance to courts, mediators, and

participants concerning the emerging problems associated with
confidentiality and mediation privilege in subsequent criminal cases.
While the substantially outweighs standard is high, the official

comments to Section 6(b)(1) make clear that these situations will be
viewed on their individual facts leaving the ultimate decision to the
'
"sound discretion of the courts."233
The drafters note that "even
without this exception, the courts can be expected to weigh heavily
the need for the evidence in a particular case, and sometimes will rule
that the defendant's constitutional rights require disclosure. 2 4 The
best way to reconcile the high standard with the comment is to
230. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 4, at 51-52 (attacking the mediation community for
providing itself with more protections against testifying than are necessary under the
UMA); Shannon, supra note 100, at 211-12 (criticizing the UMA's approach to
confidentiality and the complexity of the Act).
231. The ABA, NCCUSL, and ACR approved the UMA. UNIF. MEDIATION Acr
(2003); Firestone, supra note 98. To date, ten states plus the District of Columbia have
adopted the UMA. See MEDIATION WORKS, supra note 101; Uniform Mediation Act, ch.
35, 2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 35 (2008). New York has a bill pending to adopt the UMA. S.
1967, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
232. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Mediation Act, 2003
J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2003). Because the increasing use of mediation in both private and
court ordered contexts across the states, the drafters of the UMA set forth to create a
uniform law that would "simplify a complex area of the law." Id. at 10. The introductory
note to a 2003 symposium on the UMA highlighted four significant reasons why uniformity
of mediation law "helps bring order and understanding across state lines," including (1)
providing predictability that a statement made in the course of mediation in one state may
be sought as evidence in a subsequent legal proceeding in another state; (2) as relating to
cross-jurisdictional mediations; (3) a party deciding whether or not to sign an agreement to
mediate may not know where the mediation will occur and, as such, what privilege rules
will be applicable (4) a uniform law will contribute to simplicity for mediators, mediation
participants, and the courts. Id. at 10-11.
233. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(1) cmt. 10.
234. Id.
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recognize that there are no absolutes and that courts will apply the
standard based on the specific facts in a particular case. The Act is
new and fairly untested, and thus uncertainty remains. 23
Looking at the five pre-UMA cases, it is doubtful that the
mediation communications would be admissible in any except for the
pre-crime exculpatory case-Castellano.Nonetheless, it is important
to reflect on these cases to discern what guidance they can provide
jurisdictions adopting the UMA's substantially outweighs standard in
exculpatory and inculpatory evidence cases.
The UMA's adoption of the substantially outweighs standard
means that most cases will be decided on the micro level-the need
for the evidence and whether the evidence can be obtained from other
sources. Courts will only progress to the macro level on really tough
cases.
In exculpatory evidence cases, the probative value of the
evidence as well as the sequence of events is crucial. Assertions made
before the criminal act may explain the subsequent events. In
contrast, statements made after the criminal act often serve little
purpose other than to expound upon one's emotional reaction to the
event.
In inculpatory evidence cases, the purpose or subject matter of
the mediation is a critical factor in assessing admissibility. If the
admission is part of a settlement agreement from a mediation
convened to resolve a criminal act, then the agreement should be
admissible to determine compliance, but mediation communications
leading up to the agreement should be privileged. If the mediation
does not result in a settlement, then courts should focus on the macro
issue and only in rare circumstances allow inculpatory statements
made in an attempt to resolve the underlying offense to be used
against the defendant. If defendants and their counsel come to believe
that the mediation process is not confidential and that the state can
use it as a discovery device, then criminal mediation will no longer
remain a viable option for resolving criminal matters. The state should
not be allowed to use the mediation process to gain evidence for the
prosecution of its cases.236
235. Deason, supra note 213, at 85. "[Ilt is not useful to regard confidentiality as an 'all
or nothing' proposition. Mediation participants need to develop more nuanced
expectations about circumstances that may trigger the need for disclosure. An adequate
level of predictability requires, at a minimum, knowledge of the boundaries at which
uncertainty begins for confidentiality." Id.
236. See generally Berger, supra note 209 (proposing more prosecutorial restraint in
compliance with the Sixth Amendment).
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These suggested outcomes and guidelines are simply that-tools

to interpret and predict how courts will apply the qualified criminal
proceedings exception. New fact scenarios will continue to arise, and
courts will be called upon to hold in camera hearings and to interpret
the criminal proceedings qualified exception.
The mediation community cannot wait for the lengthy legal
process to resolve all the confidentiality issues before taking action to
address the specific ethical obligations that arise under the UMA's
criminal proceedings exception. Mediators have an ethical obligation:

(1) to stop making blanketed statements about confidentiality that
mislead the participants; and (2) to become knowledgeable about the
limits of confidentiality and the exceptions to privilege.
The issue of training and credentialing takes on new importance
in light of the UMA. Although this article has not addressed training,
the topic is ripe for further study. 237 Like the fugu chef who must take
specialized training and pass tests before being licensed, 238 so too

should mediators demonstrate a level of proficiency about the limits
of confidentiality prior to engaging in the process. It is only after they
possess this knowledge that they can adequately inform participants
about the limits of confidentiality.
The mediation community should consider implementing an
online tutorial, Mediation Expectations and Limitations that
addresses the specific issues of confidentiality and privilege. All
mediators wishing to be on court rosters, court appointed, or certified
by a mediation association would be required to take and pass the
tutorial prior to being allowed to mediate, especially in criminal
matters. Other disciplines have adopted similar tutorial programs. For
example the National Institutes of Health (NIH) provides a free,
online, two-hour tutorial for those conducting research involving
human participants. 39
237.

For information about mediation training, see TASK FORCE ON MEDIATOR

CERTIFICATION,

ACR

REPORT

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE

BOARD

OF

DIRECTORS (2004), available at http://www.acrnet.org/pdfs/certificationreport2004.pdf.
238. Fugu chefs must pass a written test and a practical test. British Broadcasting
Corp., Fugu Fish, http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A752429 ("[O]nly a quarter of applicants
pass the written test, and the practical test includes eating the fish that has been
prepared.").
239. The course is a "free, web-based course [that] presents information about the
rights and welfare of human participants in research. The two-hour tutorial is designed for
those involved in conducting research involving human participants. It satisfies the NIH
human subjects training requirement for obtaining Federal Funds." Nat'l Cancer Inst.,
Education
for
Research
Teams,
Human
Participant
Protections
http://cme.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials/learning/humanparticipant-protections.asp (last visited
Feb. 18, 2008). The current training was replaced on March 1, 2008. Id.
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Like the fugu chefs who must hone their skills, know their limits
and inform their patrons of the risks as well as the benefits of
partaking in the feast, the ethical mediator must know the limits to
confidentiality and must inform participants of those limits, especially
the criminal proceedings exception. There is an old Japanese
expression, "I want to eat fugu, but I don't want to die.""24 For
mediation participants, the expression might be, "I want to resolve my
dispute, but I don't want to eat my words."

240. Setsuko Yoshizuka, Fugu-Blow Fish: The World's Most Deadly Feast?,
(last
ABOUT.COM,
http://japanesefood.about.com/cs/seafoodfish/a/fugublowfish.htm
visited Apr. 10, 2008).

